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Abstract: The industrial control systems are facing an increasing number of sophisticated cyber
attacks that can have very dangerous consequences on humans and their environments. In order
to deal with these issues, novel technologies and approaches should be adopted. In this paper,
we focus on the security of commands in industrial IoT against forged commands and misrouting of
commands. To this end, we propose a security architecture that integrates the Blockchain and the
Software-defined network (SDN) technologies. The proposed security architecture is composed of:
(a) an intrusion detection system, namely RSL-KNN, which combines the Random Subspace Learning
(RSL) and K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) to defend against the forged commands, which target the
industrial control process, and (b) a Blockchain-based Integrity Checking System (BICS), which can
prevent the misrouting attack, which tampers with the OpenFlow rules of the SDN-enabled industrial
IoT systems. We test the proposed security solution on an Industrial Control System Cyber attack
Dataset and on an experimental platform combining software-defined networking and blockchain
technologies. The evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed
security solution.
Keywords: industrial IoT; industrial control system; SCADA; distributed control system; blockchain;
software-defined network; random subspace learning; intrusion detection system; security
1. Introduction
With the industrial revolution, we have witnessed rapid changes in factory automation,
transportation security, and surveillance in large-scale industries. To this end, Industrial IoT (IIoT) [1]
has drawn a significant interest by incorporating dense wireless devices such as Radio-Frequency
IDentification (RFID) tags [2] for machine identification, sensors for large-scale equipment monitoring
and fault diagnosis, production, manufacturing, asset monitoring and many applications for power
plant, water supplies, oil, and gas refineries.
Industrial control systems (ICS) are used to describe different systems such as Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Distributed Control system (DCS). SCADA collects and analyzes
data from substations in real-time. Each substation contains control devices, such as Programmable
Logic Controller (PLC), Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), and Intelligent Electronic Device (IED),
which manages field devices, such as sensors, actuators, and meters. The collected field information is
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sent to a central facility, which consists of (1) SCADA server to process the information, and (2)
Human Machine Interface (HMI) for information displaying. DCS, on the other hand, focuses
on the automatic control of the industrial infrastructure. Other applications like: data historian,
Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES), and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP).
Wide-Area Network (WAN) connections, such as Broadband Internet, Fourth generation
(4G) communication, Long Term Evolution (LTE), or Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)
allow ICS to extend their networks to large distances in order to connect remote substations.
Industrial communication protocols like: Modbus TCP, DNP3, and OPC-UA are used to exchange
data between the different components of the industrial control system. Figure 1 shows the typical
architecture of ICS over WAN. Industrial control systems are used in different critical infrastructures
where IIoT can play a major role, such as in power plants, water supplies, oil, gas, and renewable
energy facilities.
Figure 1. Typical architecture of industrial control systems (ICS) over Wide-Area Network (WAN).
In fact, with the autonomous exchange of data among devices and a server, or in a device-to-device
manner, either directly or over a network, will benefit the industrial control system to control and
monitor the industrial process locally or at the remote location. The integration of IoT solutions with
ICS, named also fourth Generation ICS [3,4], allows collecting and analyzing a large data set over the
whole industrial area. By this way, this integration is foreseen as a viable solution towards smart and
efficient data gathering and aggregation frameworks for the entire automation industry [5].
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are becoming primary targets of cyber attacks due to their
increased interconnection with other corporate networks. Their exposure to private and public
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networks has increased the risk of such attacks targeting ICS in recent years [6]. These attacks cause
a variety of damages and drastic consequences to humans and their environment. For instance,
a power blackout in Ukraine’s capital Kiev happened because a SCADA system, which was linked
to the 330 kilowatt substation, was influenced by external sources outside normal parameters [7].
In addition, as ICS deploys a large number of network devices like routers and switches, they bring
other security issues. As each device represents a possible entry point to the attacker, the more devices
we have, the more risks ICS is exposed to. Besides, network devices require continuous management
and configuration, which is costly and time-consuming. To deal with this issue, software-defined
networking (SDN) [8,9] technology was proposed to facilitate software and hardware updates on the
network devices. This is achieved by moving the control of lookup tables stored in the network devices
to a central location that allows easy control and management. In this way, the risk of compromising the
network devices could significantly be reduced. Software-defined wide-area network (SD-WAN) [10]
is a specific application of the SDN technology that is applied to WAN connections. Similar to SDN,
SD-WAN also decouples the networking hardware from its control mechanism. However, SD-WAN
focuses more on cost savings by reducing the deployment and operational costs. Gartner [11] predicted
in 2015 that 30% of enterprises would deploy SD-WAN technology in their branches by the end of 2019.
In this paper, we propose a security architecture for the industrial control system, which is
integrated with the SD-WAN technology. The architecture considers the attacks that target the ICS
commands, and negatively affect the correct functionality of the ICS. The attacks are classified into
two types: (a) forged ICS command that target the industrial control process, and (b) misrouting of
commands that is brought to the surface due to the adoption of the software-defined technology,
e.g., an adversary that injects fraudulent flow rules, which prevent correct routing of ICS commands
and information. Thus, the proposed security architecture requires two main complementary
components: (a) an intrusion detection system to defend against the forged commands, and (b)
an SD-WAN-based security solution, which prevents the misrouting of commands and information
through tampering of the flow rules. The main contributions of the paper are the following:
• We propose an SD-WAN architecture for industrial control systems.
• We define the attack model that can target the proposed architecture. The attack model comprises:
forged command attacks that target the industrial control process, and SDN-related attacks that
misroute commands and information.
• We propose a security solution for the proposed SD-WAN architecture that includes two
complementary components:
– An intrusion detection system (IDS), named RSL-KNN, against forged command attacks
that target the industrial control process, which leverages the random subspace learning
approach and K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) classifier to outperform conventional machine
learning classifiers.
– A Blockchain-based Integrity Checking System (BICS), which can defend against the
misrouting attack, by detecting in a short time any tampering with the OpenFlow rules
and preventing the execution of the rules. Differently from [12–14] that detects this attack by
analyzing the flow rules, our system is lightweight in the sense that it only compares the traffic
flow rules, which are originated from the vSwitch, with the one sent by the SDN controller.
• We evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed security solution. By applying
the random subspace learning-based IDS on the Industrial Control System Cyber attack
Dataset [15,16], promising accuracy results are achieved. On the other hand, a blockchain-based
integrity checking system is able to detect all attacks against the flow rules at a very low
detection time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the related work.
In Section 3, we present the SD-WAN architecture for the industrial control system along with the
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attack model. In Section 4, we describe the main components of the security solution for the SDN-based
ICS. The implementation and evaluation of the proposed security solution are presented in Section 5
and Section 6, respectively. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
2.1. Intrusion Detection Systems for ICS
In order to protect the industrial control systems, several recommendations and good practices
can be followed [17]. One important security component that can be used in order to protect these
assets against new threats is an IDS. Especially, for identifying anomalous or unexpected behavior in
ICS systems, anomaly detection systems have shown great potential [18]. The IDS must be combined
with active network monitoring mechanisms for collecting the necessary data along with traditional
defense mechanisms like firewalls and antiviruses. Recently, authors in [19] proposed a new taxonomy
of ICS IDS by taking into account the characteristics that industrial systems have. Moving away
from standard taxonomy like rule-based, misuse detection and mixed systems, the authors divided
them into three new categories, i.e, protocol analysis-based, traffic mining-based, and control process
analysis-based detection systems. There exist a number of state-of-the-art machine learning-based big
data processing technologies for anomaly detection [20]. Although the IDSs that fall into the first two
categories manage to detect standard cyber attacks by analyzing the used protocols or the traffic data
that is exchanged between different entities of the system, they fail at detecting the so-called semantic
attacks. Semantic attacks exploit the knowledge extracted from the normal operation of an ICS about
the control systems that are in place or the physical processes that take place, taking into account the
close association between ICS and physical systems. Ignoring semantics provides the attackers the
chance to gain control of some industrial processes and launch attacks that may tamper the normal
operation of some physical devices or change the operating rules on field devices. These attacks pass
unattended from traditional IDSs since they do not violate the specifications of the protocols or create
any abnormal network traffic in the system. Narayanan et Bobba [21] moved one step further by
proposing an application-level anomaly detection framework that detects attacks aiming to modify the
products that were manufactured from the industry that uses the ICS.
Many researchers came up in recent years with proposals that took advantage of machine learning
models for developing IDSs to protect the control process. Caselli et al. [22] discussed sequence
attack scenarios within an industrial control system and developed a sequence-aware intrusion
detection system. Khalili et al. [23] proposed a State-based Intrusion Detection System (SIDS) suitable
for cyber physical systems. Contrary to other industrial IDSs that consider anomalous states as
indications of the cyber attacks, SIDS manages to detect three types of attacks: anomalous states,
anomalous transitions between the normal states, and anomalous time-intervals between the normal
transitions. Zhang et al. [24] proposed a detection system for attacks against cyber physical systems.
The proposed system studied four classical classification models, including k-nearest neighbor (KNN),
decision tree, bootstrap aggregating (Bagging), and random forest. To strengthen early attack detection,
the proposed system uses an auto-associative kernel regression model. Abokifa et al. [20] developed
an algorithm for the detection of cyber-physical attacks and adjusted for smart water distribution
systems. Ghaeini et al. [25] proposed a framework for state aware anomaly detection in industrial
control systems that is proven to provide lower exposure time while offering better detection in
terms of false alarm rate. Trying to cope with data injection attacks in ICS, Wang et al. [26] proposed
a new method that uses a Long Short Term Memory Recurrent Neural Network (LSTM-RNN) as
a temporal sequences predictor. Li et al. [27] proposed a SCADA firewall model, called SCADAWall,
for SCADA security. The SCADAWall model is powered by a comprehensive packet inspection (CPI)
technology. To extend capabilities to proprietary industrial protocol protection, the SCADAWall model
uses a proprietary industrial protocols extension algorithm (PIPEA). Based on the out-of-sequence
detection algorithm, the SCADAWall model can detect abnormality within industrial operations.
Sensors 2019, 19, 3119 5 of 24
Finally, several recent review articles discuss issues related to IDS systems for ICS and SCADA [28,29],
all of them showcasing the need for novel sophisticated solutions.
2.2. Risk and Threat Modelling for ICS
Falco et al. [30] presented a study on the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) cybersecurity
risk modeling for SCADA systems. Specifically, the study demonstrated that certain risk metrics
are stronger indicators than others in evaluating the likelihood of exploits for SCADA systems.
Wood et al. [31] after identifying current risks with SCADA and ICS systems proposed a two layered
security architectural pattern to address them. On the other hand, Cook et al. [32] conclude that the
parameters for defining risk are too many (consequences C, events A, background information K,
measure of uncertainty Q, threat T, vulnerability V) and there is no proven unified risk model exists
for ICS that incorporates all of them yet, leaving this important field open for future research.
Nourian and Madnick [33] presented a study about how the vulnerabilities were exploited
by Stuxnet, which is an attack designed to interrupt the Iranian nuclear program. Based on prior
research on system safety, the study uses a system theoretic approach in order to analyze the threats
exploited by Stuxnet. This approach can identify cyber threats towards CPSs at the design level
and provides practical recommendations for more secure SCADA and automation systems. Nasr
and Varjani [34] proposed an alarm-and-trust based access management system named ATAMS, to
reinforce the security of the SCADA system against the deontological threats. The ATAMS system can
reduce the deontological threats based on the two levels, including, (i) integrity level of the substations
and (ii) the operator trust value.
2.3. Blockchain for IoT and SCADA Security
The blockchain technology can be effectively applied in almost all domains of the IoT, especially
when the IoT applications demand a decentralized security framework, as presented in [35].
Košt’ál et al. [36] proposed an improved architecture for management and monitoring of IoT devices
using a private blockchain. Agyekum et al. [37] proposed a proxy re-encryption scheme that
incorporates an inner-product encryption scheme for IoT environments. In order to improve the
routing security and efficiency for the internet of sensors, Yang et al. [38] proposed a trusted routing
scheme using blockchain and reinforcement learning.
The SCADA can be more intelligent and smart using the IoT networks. However, distributed
blockchain-based methods have been proposed recently to detect and defend against cyber-attacks
for modern power systems. Liang et al. [39] proposed a blockchain-based framework based on
three phases, namely, data transmission, verification, and storage. The data transmission phase uses
two keys, including: (1) the public key available in the meter-node network, and (2) the private key
containing the node’s private information. The verification phase uses an address-based distributed
voting mechanism in order to verify the data integrity. The block generation phase uses two strategies
as solution methods, including: (1) generating block by a fixed time, and (2) generating block by a fixed
size. Liang et al.’s framework can be considered as a promising solution but the privacy and anonymity
are not considered, which can compromise the energy trading infrastructure (e.g., using attack tree).
To trade energy in a peer-to-peer network without a central price signal, Aitzhan and Svetinovic [40]
proposed a token-based energy trading system called PriWatt, for the smart grid using distributed
smart contracts. Specifically, PriWatt system uses signing transactions and multi signatures. To validate
the authenticity of a transaction, PriWatt system uses ECDSA asymmetric cryptography. Therefore,
a transaction can be considered valid only when multiple independent parties sign this transaction.
Remarkably, PriWatt system provides certain levels of privacy and security as well as combats
double-spending attacks.
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2.4. SDN-Based SCADA
Several works [41,42] studied the integration of SDN with SCADA systems to facilitate better
management and configuration of the network devices. Due to the centralized controller with
a comprehensive view, the network operation can be better optimized compared to the traditional
management in SCADA systems. Other works focused on designing SDN-based resilient solution for
smart grids [43–47]. This is achieved by deploying redundant communications. In case of failures,
the communication and services are quickly restored. A Network-based Intrusion Detection System
(NIDS) for SDN-based SCADA systems is proposed in [48] using One-Class Classification (OCC)
algorithm on the gathered statistics from network devices. Basically, the SDN features were leveraged
to frequently modify the multipath routing mechanism between the SCADA devices. One interesting
advantage is that the IDS can detect possible malicious traffic with unknown attack signatures.
Most recently, a framework with multiple SDN controllers and security controllers is suggested in [49]
for SCADA. The local IDS in the substation collects the measurement data periodically and monitors
the control-commands. Furthermore, the global IDS that resides in the control center collects the
measurement data from the substations and detects any abnormal behavior of the control-commands
issued by the SDN controller and SCADA. In addition, a light-weight identity based cryptography is
suggested to protect the network from outsider attacks.
2.5. Fraudulent Rule Detection in SDN
In the literature, there are some surveys [50,51] that describe the attacks that can target the
SDN along with their corresponding security methods. Some methods such as FortNOX [13],
FlowChecker [12], and VeriFlow [14] are designed to detect fraudulent rules. FortNOX [13] developed
an analysis algorithm to detect rule conflicts. A rule conflict occurs when a new OpenFlow rule is
in contradiction with the existing rules. FlowChecker [13] analyzes all switch configurations using
a binary decision and model checking to detect misconfigurations within the flow tables. Veriflow [14]
checks for any violation of network invariants (e.g., availability of a path towards the destination,
absence of routing loops) when a new rule is inserted, deleted, or updated. In a multi-controller
architecture, the detection of fraudulent rules and malicious controller in [52,53] is achieved by
replicating each rule setup request to multiple controllers simultaneously in order to check for rule
consistency, which incurs a high overhead. In order to deal with the issue, requests are randomly
replicated in [54].
2.6. Comparison with Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first that combines the SDN and blockchain
technologies into one architecturally secure design for industrial control systems. In addition, it differs
from the related work in the following points:
1. Random subspace learning has never been investigated as an IDS approach for industrial control
systems to distinguish between normal events and cyber attacks.
2. We show that combining random subspace learning and K-Nearest Neighbors improves the
IDS accuracy compared to the basic machine learning classifiers, such as SVM, decision tree,
random forests, etc.
3. Differently from FortNOX [13], FlowChecker [12], and Veriflow [14] that detect fraudulent rules
based on a heavyweight analysis process, the proposed BICS architecture is lightweight in the
sense that it only leverages the blockchain technology to compare the traffic flow rules, which are
originated from the vSwitch with the one sent by the SDN controller.
4. BICS provides a scalable solution under multi-controller environment, as there is no need to
involve multiple controllers to check the rule correctness.
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3. SD-WAN Architecture for Industrial Control Systems
We propose an SD-WAN architectural design for ICS that enables network virtualization by
migrating the control layer to the cloud, which helps to allow a centralized management. As legacy
WANs can be costly and complex, SD-WAN architecture reduces the network cost by offering
zero-touch deployment, i.e., there is no need to configure the network device by plugging it in.
Instead, the device is configured from the SDN controller. In terms of security, the architecture can
provide a unified security policy across the network.
As shown in Figure 2, the proposed architecture is composed of the following components:
• Private cloud: It hosts all the components that offer a centralized control for ICS as virtual machines,
such as SCADA server, DCS server, and SDN controller.
• IP network: Instead of using a dedicated WAN for ICS, we can use the public Internet connection
between the SDN and the different substations. All devices are authenticated and end-to-end
encryption is established across the network.
• SDN controller: It is an application that manages flow control by using protocols such
as OpenFlow [55] that tells switches where to send data packets. The OpenFlow protocol
is a southbound interface between the controller and the forwarding elements such as
switches. The northbound interface considers the communication between the controller and
the applications.
• Virtual Switch: It is an application that interconnects multiple virtual machines of the same
or different hypervisors. Moreover, it also interconnects these virtual machines with other
physical switches.
Based on the above architecture, we present the attack model that targets the security of ICS
commands, and could adversely affect the correct functionality of ICS. In the following, we consider
two types of attacks:
• Forged command: Attacks that issue forged commands to intelligent electronic devices,
which trigger the execution of undesired operations, such as blackout.
• Misrouting of commands: Attacks that prevent the correct routing of commands and other
information between the SCADA server, DCS server, and the different devices of ICS. This attack
can be achieved by modifying the flow rules.
Specifically, the above mentioned attacks can be further classified as follows:
• Forged command: This type of attack considers the injection of fraudulent flow rules in the flow
table. Under this type, we can find the following attacks:
– Vswitch misconfiguration: Similar to the physical switch, the virtual switch might allow devices
impersonating another device so that it can receive network frames intended for that device.
In addition, the virtual switch might be configured to allow a device receiving frames targeted
for other devices. In this way, an attacker can masquerade as the SDN controller and insert
fraudulent rules in the flow tables of other vSwitches.
– Unauthorized Access to SDN controller: When an attacker impersonates an SDN controller,
it can gain access to the network resources and control all the network operations,
including injecting fraudulent rules in the flow tables.
– Man-in-the-middle attack between switch and controller: An attacker, by spoofing the identities
of the two nodes, can secretly intercept and modify the communication between them.
This attack can be achieved through different mechanisms, such as vSwitch misconfiguration
or port mirroring. In this way, it can send fake flow rules to the vSwitches.
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• Misrouting of commands: This type attacks the control process of the ICS by performing Unauthorized
Access to vSwitch. Due to the vSwitch misconfiguration, the attacker can gain access to the vSwitch
of the substation and issue fake commands to the different control devices.
We consider that the security of industrial communication protocols like OPC-UA, DNP3,
and Modbus is not within the scope of this work, as they have already been analyzed [56–59].
Figure 2. Software-defined networking (SDN)-based ICS architecture.
4. Security Architecture Description
In this section, we propose two security components, as shown in Figure 3, to address the attack
model defined in Section 3, which are:
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Figure 3. Security architecture for SDN-based ICS.
• Intrusion detection system (IDS) to identify malicious command issued to the control devices.
In this work, we propose an IDS using the Random Subspace learning (RSL). Later, in Section 6,
we show that RSL-KNN, which is the combination of RSL and KNN classifiers, gives better results
than the conventional machine learning classifiers.
• Blockchain-based integrity checking system (BICS), which aims to detect any injection of
fraudulent flow rules in the vSwitches.
4.1. Random Subspace Learning-Based IDS
The concept of random subspace learning is proposed by Barandiaran [60]. The Random
Subspace Learning (RSL) method is an ensemble learning technique, which is also called features
bagging or attributes bagging [61]. It is used to improve prediction and classification tasks as:
(1) it employs ensemble construction of base classifiers instead of a single classifier, and (2) it takes
random subsets of features instead of the entire set of features. In this way, the correlation between
features among classifiers is reduced. This method has proved its success in a lot of prediction and
classification problems [62–65].
The random subspace learning process is illustrated in Figure 4, and consists of two phases:
training and testing.
In the training phase, we randomly select S features from a set of F features such that S ≤ F.
The selected features are fed to a machine learning algorithm to generate a classifier/learner.
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This operation is repeated B times, and at each time S features are picked at random with replacement
to generate a different classifier.
In the testing phase, the outputs from all distinct learners are combined by majority voting to
obtain the final prediction or classification result. The main advantage is that combining classifiers
improves the accuracy, especially if the classifiers are independent, or not correlated with each other
through features. In other words, the classifiers are fed with different sets of features from each other,
which reduces the correlation between features among classifiers.
More specifically, we assume that the RSL model contains a number of individual classifiers,
which are built from S subspaces of features defined as {Ci(.)}i=1,···L. The number of labels returned
by the individual classifiers will be given as {yi}i=1,···L, where the returned labels belong to the set of
labels (Y) in the training dataset.
For unseen instances x(k=1,···X) of F features, each classifier will classify them based on its features
subspace Sj=1,··· f ∈ F separately. Then, the outputs from separate classifiers are represented as:
yi = Ci(xk, Sj=1,··· f ). (1)
Finally, all outputs from separate classifiers are combined using the majority voting Algorithm [63]
to obtain the final classification label y as in the following equation:
y = arg max
yi
L
∑
i=1
yi ∈ Y. (2)
More formally, Algorithm 1 shows the steps to generate the ensemble of random subspace
classifiers, and the ones to compute the predicted labels of unseen instances. Let TFN denote the original
training dataset of F features and N instances, TSN denote the partial training dataset instances of only
S features, which are randomly selected from the original training dataset, ZSM represents the testing
dataset of M instances with the same selected features S as the ones selected in the training phase,
ML denotes the machine learning algorithm. In the training phase, we take ML and TSN as input B
times to generate a classifier CLb, 1 ≤ b ≤ B. In the testing phase, we compute PMb , which represents
the classification labels of M unseen instances using the base classifier CLb. Then, we compute PMl ,
which is the final classification labels of M instances after majority voting of the base classifiers.
As will be seen in Section 5, RSL-KNN classifier is obtained by combining random subspace
learning and KNN algorithm. In other words, we get RSL-KNN by setting ML (resp., replacing the
Learning Algorithm component) to KNN (resp., with KNN) in Algorithm 1 (resp., Figure 4).
Figure 4. Random Subspace Learning process: training and testing.
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Algorithm 1 Random Subspace learning classifier.
Input: TSN , Z
S
M, B, ML
Output: YMl
1: for b = 1 to B do . Training phase
2: Set the dimension S ≤ F;
3: Select randomly s features from TFN to derive T
S
N ;
4: CLb = Build_RSL(TSN , ML) . Build Random subspace learning classifier based on dataset T
S
N
and machine learning algorithm ML;
5: end for
6: for b = 1 to B do . Testing phase
7: PMb ←− CLb(ZSM) . Classify ZSM instances using the built model;
8: end for
9: PMl = MajorityVote({PMb }Bb=1) . Find predicted class labels YM using Majority voting of base
classifier models;
10: return PMl ;
4.2. Blockchain-Based Integrity Checking System
Before describing the security solution, we make the following assumptions:
• We assume that the SD-WAN ICS is not compromised (i.e., free from malicious code before the
installation of the Blockchain-based integrity checking system. Otherwise, forged rules can be
considered as legitimate.
• The Blockchain-based integrity checking system only focuses on southbound communication.
We assume that the northbound communication between SCADA server, DCS server, and IDS
from one side and the SDN controller from the other side, is secure.
• We assume that the SDN controller is located in a private cloud, and only accessible from a single
host through an authentication and access control mechanism.
The Blockchain [35] is the key element in the design of our integrity checking systems. The basic
idea is to provide a solution where all flow rules that are generated from the controller are stored
in a verifiable and immutable database. The blockchain is a sequence of blocks, which are linked
together by their hash values. In the blockchain network, each user has two keys: one private key to
sign the blockchain transaction and one public key that represents its unique address. The user signs
a transaction using its private key and broadcasts it to its peers in the network for validation. After
validating the broadcast block, which contains the transaction, it is appended to the blockchain. Once
recorded, the data in any given block cannot be changed without alteration of all subsequent blocks.
In addition, the data exists in multiple hosts at once, so any changes would be rejected by the peer’s
hosts. In this work, we proposed a private (or permissioned) blockchain. Differently from the public
blockchains, the private ones determine who is allowed to participate in the network, and defined
actions and permissions are assigned to identifiable participants. Hence, consensus mechanisms such
as Proof of Work are not required. Our blockchain is composed of only two nodes: SDN controller,
and firewall. The SDN controller creates blocks and shares it with the firewall via the blockchain.
The first node has all the permissions, i.e., read, write, and send, whereas the firewall can only read
and receive. As shown in Figure 5, the blockchain-based integrity checking system is carried in the
following sequences:
• Upon receiving a request from the Northbound application, the SDN controller is designed to
send the corresponding flow rules to the vSwitches. In our design, the SDN controller is also
a member of a blockchain. It hashes the flow rules and puts them in a block that is distributed
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to the other nodes of the blockchain. The SDN controller is the only node in the blockchain,
which has the right to create blocks, whereas the rest of the nodes can only read the blockchain.
• When the flow rules reach the vSwitch node, the latter updates its flow table and saves the rules
in the log file.
• The Firewall collects the vSwitch logs and accesses the BlockChain to obtain the flow rules sent by
the controller.
• If the firewall finds that the two rules, from vSwitch and blockchain, are not similar, it notifies the
Administrator to take the appropriate countermeasures to fix this mismatching.SDN controller Northbound Application Sends ﬂow rulesFirewall vSwitchCheckNetwork AdministratorBlockchainNotiﬁcation vSwitch log
Figure 5. Flowchart execution of blockchain-based integrity checking system (BICS).
5. Implementation
5.1. Random Subspace Learning-Based IDS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed IDS using a real case study scenario
that is implemented in [16], and using the Power System Dataset, which is a part of the Industrial
Control System Cyber Attack Dataset [15]. Figure 6 shows the industrial control power system
architecture. It is composed of the following components:
• Two power generators: G1 and G2.
• Four breakers from BR1 to BR4.
• Two transmission lines: L1 between BR1 and BR2, and L2 between BR3 and BR4.
• R1 through R4 are intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) to switch the breakers on or off. The IEDs
send information to the control room through a substation switch and a router.
As explained in [16], there are four synchrophasors, each of which measures 29 features,
which give in total 116 phasor measurement unit (PMU) measurements. There are also additional 12
features from control panel logs, Snort logs and relay logs. Thus, 128 features are used in this case
study scenario. Examples of some features, which are extracted from each PMU, are as follows.
• PA1:VH-PA3:VH: This feature represents phase A-C voltage angle.
• DF: This feature represents frequency delta ( d fdt ) for relays.
The list of 128 features along with their descriptions are given in [15]. The dataset [15] considers
the following two normal events and three attack events. The normal events are as follows:
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Figure 6. Case study: industrial control power system ([16]).
• Short-circuit fault: It represents a short in a power-line and can occur at different locations along
the line.
• Line maintenance: Power system operators occasionally must take a transmission line out of service
to allow maintenance.
The dataset also considers the following attack events:
• Remote tripping command injection: This attack sends a command to a relay and causes a breaker
to open.
• Relay setting change: Relays are controlled via configurable settings. Certain settings exist to disable
relay operations. This class of attacks alters relay settings to disable relay operation such that the
relay will not trip for valid commands or faults.
• Data Injection: This attack aims to imitate a valid fault by altering system measurements followed
by sending an illicit trip command from a compromised computer to relays at the ends of the
transmission line. This attack aims to blind the operator and causes a blackout.
The dataset is composed of 15 sub-datasets, as shown in Table 1. The events in SCADA systems
are used in the following two main classification tasks:
• Classification of multi-class events: This classification task contains 37 scenarios of events,
and includes normal event, natural event, and attack events with their own class labels.
• Classification of binary class events: This task also contains 37 event scenarios, which are divided
into nine normal events and 28 attack events. All the 15 sub-datasets consist of thousands of
distinct event types and are sampled at 1% in a random manner. Therefore, each sub-dataset
contains 3711 attack instances, 294 samples of no event instances, and 1221 natural events instances.
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of instances in the 15 SCADA sub-datasets.
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Table 1. Distribution of datasets.
Parameter Value
Sub-dataset 1 4966
Sub-dataset 2 5096
Sub-dataset 3 5415
Sub-dataset 4 5202
Sub-dataset 5 5161
Sub-dataset 6 4967
Sub-dataset 7 5236
Sub-dataset 8 5315
Sub-dataset 9 5340
Sub-dataset 10 5569
Sub-dataset 11 5251
Sub-dataset 12 5224
Sub-dataset 13 5271
Sub-dataset 14 5115
Sub-dataset 15 5276
The RSL method is also implemented using Weka tool [66]. Table 2 summarizes the parameters
that are considered in the implementation. A 10-fold cross-validation strategy is also adopted to apply
the proposed method on the 15 SCADA sub-datasets.
Table 2. Parameters Settings of RSL method.
Parameter Value
Batch Size 100
number Iterations 5, 15, 20
Seed 1
Subspace Size 0.5
Similarity function Euclidean distance
5.2. Blockchain-Based Integrity Checking System
The Blockchain-based integrity checking system is implemented, as shown in Figure 7, using the
following components:
• Private cloud: We use Openstack [67] to implement the private cloud.
• BlockChain: We use Multichain [68], which is derived from Bitcoin Core [69], to implement
a private blockchain. It uses JSON [70] to create blocks. The role of this blockchain is to save all
the operations transmitted from the SDN controller to the different switches. Multichain ensures
the following properties:
– The activity of the blockchain is only visible to the chosen participants.
– It provides read and write privileges on the transactions
• SDN controller: We use ONOS [71] to implement SDN controller. ONOS is an SDN that
provides the control plane of the network. It manages its components such as switches and
routers, and links. It runs the software that provides communication services to end-users and
neighboring networks.
• Mininet: Mininet [72] is a network emulator, which creates a network of virtual hosts, switches,
controllers, and links. It allows creating an SDN prototype to simulate a network topology using
switches supporting OpenFlow.
As shown in Figure 7, the Insert() program captures the traffic sent from the ONOS controller to
the vSwiches in order to get the flow rules of the ONOS controller and save them on the blockchain.
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In order to access the blockchain, write permissions to create blocks on the blockchain are assigned to
this program. Each created block contains the following information:
• PUBLISHER: the SDN controller identifier.
• Data: The flow rule, and consists of the following records:
– ID: The identifier of the rule.
– TABLEID: The flow table identifier.
– DEVICEID: The Vswitch identifier.
– TYPE: The rule type: input/output.
– OUTPORT: The output port number.
– INPORT: The input port number.
– PRIORITY: The priority of the rule.
– MACSRC: The source MAC address of flow.
– MACDST: The destination MAC address of flow.
• BLOCKTIME: The creation time of the block.
• BID: The block ID.
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Figure 7. Implementation components of BICS.
6. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of two components of our solution: Random Subspace
Learning IDS, and Blockchain-based integrity checking system (BICS).
6.1. Random Subspace Learning IDS
In the following, we present the performance results of the Random Subspace Learning IDS with
respect to effectiveness and efficiency.
6.1.1. Effectiveness Evaluation
In this section, we use a set of baseline machine learning classifiers to test their ability to
detect SCADA attacks. The used baseline classifiers are as follows: Linear Support Vector Machine
(LSVM), Bayes Network (BN), Naive Bayes with kernel estimator (NB-K), K-Nearest Neighbor
(KNN), AdaBoostM1, Bagging, Decision Tree (DT), and Random Forests (RF). All these classifiers are
applied on the 15 SCADA datasets and implemented using the open-source tool of machine learning,
namely Weka [66]. In the implementation, we fix the number of iterations for ensemble classifiers to be
25, the block size to be 100, and the bag size to be 50. Other settings remain as default. A 10-fold cross
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validation strategy is used in the testing. This strategy randomly partitions the datasets into 10 sets of
instances and selects one set for testing and the other nine sets for training. We repeat this strategy
10 times and take the average to summarize the results for each of the used 15 sub-datasets.
The evaluation results are presented under the following metrics:
• Accuracy = TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
• False Positive Rate = FP
FP + TN
where TP, TN, FP, and FN denote true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative, respectively.
Tables 3 and 4 show the accuracy results of the above-mentioned machine learning classifiers
under binary classification (natural and attack) and multi-class classification (natural and different
types of attacks), respectively.
Table 3. Accuracy results under binary classification.
Dataset LSVM BN NB-K KNN AdaBoostM1 Bagging DT RF
Sub-dataset 1 78.27% 73.42% 71.93% 94.38% 93.60% 92.87% 92.65% 95.53%
Sub-dataset 3 71.39% 75.55% 68.50% 94.40% 92.95% 91.86% 92.41% 94.92%
Sub-dataset 5 71.61% 73.86% 71.13% 95.16% 93.41% 91.65% 92.81% 95.47%
Sub-dataset 7 69.46% 71.80% 58.88% 93.50% 91.87% 89.98% 88.60% 93.33%
Sub-dataset 9 69.46% 71.80% 58.88% 93.50% 91.87% 89.98% 88.60% 93.33%
Sub-dataset 10 70.86% 77.93% 71.23% 94.65% 92.78% 91.76% 92.93% 95.44%
Sub-dataset 13 77.94% 75.34% 75.74% 95.49% 94.10% 92.20% 92.91% 95.96%
Sub-dataset 15 64.69% 73.16% 68.33% 93.33% 92.53% 91.41% 90.35% 94.81%
Table 4. Accuracy results under multi-class classification.
Dataset LSVM BN NB-K KNN AdaBoostM1 Bagging DT RF
Sub-dataset 1 27.51% 71.65% 16.17% 86.25% 25.29% 79.56% 9.01% 79.21%
Sub-dataset 3 28.99% 73.11% 18.76% 87.66% 22.53% 77.40% 8.46% 77.51%
Sub-dataset 5 27.17% 74.64% 19.71% 87.04% 21.00% 79.15% 9.01% 78.78%
Sub-dataset 7 29.79% 73.70% 14.32% 86.90% 20.61% 78.61% 74.57% 77.85%
Sub-dataset 9 30.36% 70.21% 18.61% 85.86% 25.02% 74.23% 25.60% 74.08%
Sub-dataset 10 23.56% 73.30% 17.01% 87.59% 19.38% 79.24% 24.74% 78.54%
Sub-dataset 13 27.43% 72.89% 13.79% 87.00% 19.35% 75.79% 82.60% 78.62%
Sub-dataset 15 27.54% 73.88% 19.45% 87.06% 29.44% 72.37% 83.19% 73.29%
Motivated by the accuracy results of intrusion detection for KNN classifier compared to other
classifiers, we propose an effective method that combines the random subspace method with
KNN classifier, named Random Subspace Learning-based K-Nearest Neighbor (RSL-KNN) method.
The basic idea behind RSL-KNN method is to create sufficient KNN classifiers using different random
subsets of selected features. This idea improves the accuracy, especially when there is a large number
of features. Table 5 shows the accuracy results of intrusion detection using binary classification (natural
and attack) and based on three different numbers of learners. Table 6 shows the accuracy results
of RSL-KNN under multi-class classification (natural and different types of attacks) and based on
three different numbers of learners. We can observe that RSL-KNN outperforms KNN under both
classification tasks. As shown in Table 7, while the false positive rates of RSL-KNN under multi-class
classification are between 0.3% and 0.4%, they are higher binary-class classification.
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Table 5. Accuracy results of Random Subspace Learning-based K-Nearest Neighbor (RSL-KNN) under
binary classification.
Dataset 5 15 20
Sub-dataset 1 95.7108% 95.8921% 95.8719%
Sub-dataset 2 95.0483% 95.2456% 95.1272%
Sub-dataset 3 95.7341% 95.9926% 95.9187%
Sub-dataset 4 95.0980% 95.1749% 95.1749%
Sub-dataset 5 96.2798% 96.3767% 96.5511%
Sub-dataset 6 95.0473% 95.7318% 95.7318%
Sub-dataset 7 94.9007% 95.3209% 95.2636%
Sub-dataset 8 95.0517% 95.3904% 95.5974%
Sub-dataset 9 94.7753% 95.1685% 95.1685%
Sub-dataset 10 95.5827% 96.0855% 96.1393%
Sub-dataset 11 95.7913% 95.9246% 95.7722%
Sub-dataset 12 95.5781% 95.7695% 95.9418%
Sub-dataset 13 96.2626% 96.7179% 96.7369%
Sub-dataset 14 95.3275% 95.4839% 95.4839%
Sub-dataset 15 94.8635% 95.0152% 95.1099%
Table 6. Accuracy results of RSL-KNN under multi-class classification.
Dataset 5 15 20
Sub-dataset 1 89.3274% 89.7704% 89.9919%
Sub-dataset 2 88.3212% 88.9130 % 89.1300%
Sub-dataset 3 90.2678% 90.5817% 90.7295%
Sub-dataset 4 89.2349% 89.3118% 89.7924%
Sub-dataset 5 89.9632% 90.2538% 90.2151%
Sub-dataset 6 89.7725% 90.6986% 90.7389%
Sub-dataset 7 89.5913% 89.6677% 89.8778%
Sub-dataset 8 89.8024% 90.5550 % 90.6115%
Sub-dataset 9 88.6891% 88.9139% 88.8015%
Sub-dataset 10 90.1239% 90.7883% 90.5189%
Sub-dataset 11 89.6210% 90.2495% 90.3828%
Sub-dataset 12 90.1417% 91.0796% 91.0605%
Sub-dataset 13 90.1347% 90.5141% 90.4003%
Sub-dataset 14 88.6413% 89.1300% 89.4233%
Sub-dataset 15 89.2911% 89.9545% 90.0872%
Table 7. False positive rate of RSL-KNN under binary and multi-class classification.
Binary-Class Classification Multi-Class Classification
Dataset 5 15 20 5 15 20
Sub-dataset 1 8.4% 8.3% 8.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3%
Sub-dataset 2 7.2% 7.0% 7.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3%
Sub-dataset 3 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Sub-dataset 4 6.4% 6.4% 6.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Sub-dataset 5 5.7% 5.8% 5.6% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Sub-dataset 6 7.1% 6.3% 6.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Sub-dataset 7 8.5% 8.4% 8.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Sub-dataset 8 7.4% 7.1% 6.7% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Sub-dataset 9 6.9% 6.6% 6.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Sub-dataset 10 6.4% 5.5% 5.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4%
Sub-dataset 11 7.9% 7.8% 8.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Sub-dataset 12 5.6% 6.7% 5.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Sub-dataset 13 7.7% 7.2% 7.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Sub-dataset 14 7.7% 7.5% 7.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Sub-dataset 15 6.2% 6.1% 5.8% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3%
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6.1.2. Efficiency Evaluation
To evaluate the time cost of training and testing of RSL-KNN compared to KNN classifier, we train
and test both classifiers on sub-dataset 9, which contains 5340 instances. This dataset is divided into
3738 instances for training and 1602 for testing and the time cost is measured for binary and multi-class
classification. Table 8 shows the time of training and testing in seconds for both classifiers. We can
notice that RSL-KNN incurs an insignificant additional time during the training. In the testing phase,
RSL-KNN shows higher values than KNN.
Table 8. Efficiency results of RSL-KNN and KNN.
Classifier Model Training Time on 3738 Instances Testing Time on 1602 Instances Task
KNN 0.01 0.88 Binary class classification0.01 6.45 Multi-class classification
RSL-KNN 0.05 3.64 Binary class classification0.05 15.04 Multi-class classification
6.2. Blockchain-Based Integrity Checking System
6.2.1. Security Analysis
We analyze the security of BICS and discuss its resilience against the following attacks:
• Unauthorized Access to SDN controller: We assumed that the SDN controller is located in a private
cloud, and only accessible from a single host. Thus, it is impossible for an external adversary
to gain authorized access to the SDN controller. In addition, by applying an authentication
and access control mechanism, we can prevent unauthorized hosts from accessing the network
resources, as explained in [73]. Therefore, there is no way that fraudulent flow rules are generated
from the SDN controller.
• Man-in-the-middle attack between switch and controller: As fraudulent flow rules cannot be generated
from the SDN controller, and as the latter is the only node that has the right to create entries in
the blockchain, therefore, the blockchain only stores legitimate flow rules. If the flow table of
the vSwitch is poisoned with tampered rules, the firewall will eventually detect this attack after
comparing the vSwitch logs and the rules stored in the blockchain.
• vSwitch misconfiguration: Like the Man-in-the-middle attack, if forged flow rules are injected in the
flow table of the vSwitch, it is possible to detect this attack.
• Flow table overflow attack: External attackers can launch DoS/DDoS attack to inject a large number
of flow rules, which leads to flow table overflow. All the injected flow rules will be detected by
BICS after comparing them with ones stored in the blockchain, Hence, this attack can be mitigated
by deleting each detected injected flow rule.
• Blockchain poisoning: Under this attack, an adversary impersonates an SDN controller and injects
the same flow rule in both the vSwitch and the blockchain. This attack is not possible, as the
blockchain is only updated by the SDN controller that has a unique private key.
• Blockchain vulnerabilities The blockchaim might suffer from many vulnerabilities such as:
– 51% vulnerability: If a single miner has more than 50% of the total computing power of the
blockchain, then it can hinder the normal operations of the blockchain.
– Hiding blocks: The participant only exposes transactions that are in his favor.
– Whitewhashing: The participant makes a new identity to get rid of his bad reputation)
– Refusal to sign: The participant does not sign a transaction that is not in his favor.
The above vulnerabilities cannot be exploited in case of BICS as we deploy a private blockchain,
and the participants are trusted and are within the internal network. However, if the private key
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of the SDN controller is leaked, an adversary can exploit this vulnerability to launch some attacks
such as tampering, impersonation, and Man-in-the-middle attack. Here, we consider two cases:
– External adversary: If the adversary tries to use the private key to generate fake blocks,
this attempt will be detected as the operation comes from outside the network, whereas the
SDN controller is located inside the network.
– Internal adversary: To prevent an internal adversary from using the private key and generate
fake blocks, the SDN controller is only accessible from a single host and access control
mechanism are implemented.
In addition, to mitigate the risk of private key leakage, the network administrator needs to
implement security controls related to key management.
6.2.2. Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of BICS by varying the number of false rules that are injected into
the network. In order to perform this test, we disconnect the SDN controller and inject the rules at
the switch-level. Table 9 summarizes the detection time and the detection rate of BICS. We observe
that BICS achieves a detection rate of 100% with a very low detection time. The full detection rate
is explained by the fact that the blockchain is immutable, i.e., it ensures that data once written to
a blockchain cannot be altered. To ensure immutability, the blockchain is based on two main concepts:
hashes and chains of blocks, which are proved mathematically to ensure data integrity. If an adversary
creates a fraudulent flow rule and wants to inject it in the vSwitch, it cannot alter an existing flow
rule in the blockchain and make it similar to a fraudulent one. In addition, as proved in Section 6.2.1,
any injection of new forged flow rule in the flow table of the vSwitch is eventually detected. Moreover,
it is important to mention that the detection time of BICS is scalable with respect to the number of
injected rules.
To evaluate the execution time overhead of BICS, we measure the below metrics by varying the
number of vSwitches that are deployed in the network.
• Blockchain Creation Time (BCT): is the time needed to create a blockchain block.
• Log Retrieval Time (LRT): is the time needed for the firewall to retrieve the switch log.
• Rule Retrieval Time (RRT): is the time needed for the firewall to retrieve the rules from the blockchain.
• Processing Time (PT): is the time needed for the firewall to compare the rules retrieved from
blochain and the log retrieved from the switch.
• Execution time overhead (ETO): is the total execution time of the BICS operation, which is the sum
of BCT, LRT, RRT, and PT.
Table 10 shows that ETO increases as the number of switches increases. This is because the firewall
has to retrieve the log information from each switch, which affects LRT. On the other hand, we observe
that BCT, RRT, and PT are low and are less affected by increasing the the number of switches. We can
also observe that BICS incurs a very low block creation time compared to other public blockchain
platforms, e.g., bitcoin, that requires around 10 min to create one block [74]. This is due to the fact
that these blockchains run a consensus mechanism like Proof of Work (PoW) or Proof of State (PoS) in
order to mine, validate and append a new block to the blockchain. In case of BICS, no consensus is
required, and it is replaced with access rights that are assigned to known participants.
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Table 9. Detection performance of BICS.
Number of Injected Rules Detection Time (s) Detection Rate (%)
10 2.40 100%
50 2.43 100%
100 2.44 100%
200 2.45 100%
500 2.54 100%
750 2.57 100%
1000 2.64 100%
1500 2.70 100%
2000 2.83 100%
Table 10. Execution time overhead of BICS.
Number of vSwitches BCT (s) LRT (s) RRT (s) PT (s) ETO (s)
10 0.248 2.339 0.143 0.003 2.485
20 0.336 2.592 0.176 0.008 2.77
30 0.194 2.876 0.202 0.018 3.097
40 0.190 3.059 0.146 0.028 3.233
50 0.228 3.555 0.160 0.043 3.759
60 0.311 3.721 0.169 0.064 3.954
70 0.324 4.246 0.170 0.105 4.522
80 0.333 4.544 0.155 0.154 4.854
90 0.412 5.400 0.228 0.146 5.774
100 0.443 5.724 0.238 0.191 6.154
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a security architecture for IoT-based industrial control
systems, which integrates the Blockchain and the Software-defined wide-area network technologies.
The proposed security architecture is composed of an intrusion detection system, named RSL-KNN,
and a Blockchain-based Integrity Checking System (BICS). The proposed security solution has been
tested on an Industrial Control System Cyber attack Dataset and on an experimental platform
combining software-defined networking and blockchain technologies. The proposed security solution
has produced an overall good performance. RSL-KNN has scored an accuracy of 96.73% and 91.07%
under binary class and multi-class classification tasks, respectively. In addition, BICS can detect
fraudulent flow rules at a detection rate of 100%, and is scalable in terms of detection time. As a part
of future work, we plan to test more Industrial Control System (ICS) cyber attacks datasets, and apply
different deep learning techniques for better IDS accuracy. Moreover, it would be interesting to leverage
the blockchain technology to prevent injection of fraudulent flow rules in the flow tables, instead of
only detecting them.
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